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I extend the Epstein-Zin-lognormal consumption-based asset-pricing model to allow for general i.i.d.
consumption growth. Information about the higher moments--equivalently, cumulants--of consumption
growth is encoded in the cumulant-generating function. I apply the framework to economies with rare
disasters, and argue that the importance of such disasters is a double-edged sword: parameters that
govern the frequency and sizes of rare disasters are critically important for asset pricing, but extremely
hard to calibrate. I show how to sidestep this issue by using observable asset prices to make inferences
that are robust to the details of the underlying consumption process.
Ian Martin




ian.martin@gsb.stanford.eduThe combination of power utility and i.i.d. lognormal consumption growth makes for
a tractable benchmark model in which asset prices and expected returns can be found in
closed form. Introducing the consumption-based model, Cochrane (2005, p. 12) writes,
\The combination of lognormal distributions and power utility is one of the basic tricks
to getting analytical solutions in this kind of model."
This paper demonstrates that the lognormality assumption can be dropped without
sacricing tractability, thereby allowing for straightforward and exible analysis of the
possibility that, say, consumption is subject to occasional disasters. There has recently
been considerable interest in reviving the idea of Rietz (1988) that the presence of rare
disasters, or fat tails more generally, can help to explain asset pricing phenomena such
as the riskless rate, equity premium and other puzzles (Barro (2006a), Farhi and Gabaix
(2008), Gabaix (2008), Jurek (2008)). Here, I take a dierent line, closer in spirit to
Weitzman (2007), and argue that the importance of rare, extreme events is a double-
edged sword: those model parameters which are most important for asset prices, such
as disaster parameters, are also the hardest to calibrate, precisely because the disasters
in question are rare.
Working under two assumptions|that there is a representative agent with Epstein-
Zin preferences and that consumption growth is i.i.d.|I exploit, in Section I, a mathe-
matical object (the cumulant-generating function) in terms of which the equity premium,
riskless rate, consumption-wealth ratio and mean consumption growth (the \fundamen-
tal quantities") can be simply expressed. Cumulant-generating functions crop up else-
where in the nance literature; the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate how
neatly they dovetail with the standard framework used in consumption-based asset-
pricing and macroeconomics. Importantly, the framework allows for the possibility of
disasters, but is agnostic about whether or not they occur. I present results in both
discrete-time and continuous-time settings.
The expressions derived relate the fundamental quantities directly to the cumulants
(equivalently, moments) of consumption growth. I show, for example, how the precau-
tionary savings eect which determines the riskless rate in a lognormal model generalizes
2in the presence of higher cumulants.
I illustrate the framework by investigating a continuous-time model featuring rare
disasters, and show that the model's predictions are sensitively dependent on the cal-
ibration assumed. As a stark example, take a consumption-based model in which the
representative agent has relative risk aversion equal to 4. Now add to the model a certain
type of disaster that strikes, on average, once every 1,000 years, and reduces consump-
tion by 64 per cent. (Barro (2006a) documents that Germany and Greece each suered
such a fall in per capita real GDP during the Second World War.) The introduction
of this disaster drives the riskless rate down by 5.9 percentage points and increases the
equity premium by 3.7 per cent.1 Very rare, very severe events exert an extraordinary
inuence on the benchmark model, and we do not expect to estimate their frequency
and intensity directly from the data.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to nding ways around this pessimistic conclu-
sion. We can, for example, detect the inuence of disaster events indirectly, by observing
asset prices. I argue, therefore, that the standard approach|calibrating a particular
model and trying to t the fundamental quantities|is not the way to go. I turn things
round, viewing the fundamental quantities as observables, and making inferences from
them. It then becomes possible to make nonparametric statements that are robust to
the details of the consumption growth process.
In this spirit, I derive, in section III, robust restrictions on preference parameters
that are valid in any Epstein-Zin-i.i.d. model that is consistent with the observed funda-
mentals. My results restrict the time-preference rate, , and elasticity of intertemporal
substitution,  , to lie in a certain subset of the positive quadrant. (See Figure 4.) These
parameters are of central importance for nancial and macroeconomic models. The
restrictions depend only on the Epstein-Zin-i.i.d. assumptions and on observed values
of the fundamental quantities, and not, for example, on any assumptions about the
existence, frequency or size of disasters. They are complementary to econometric or
1The eect is smaller with Epstein-Zin preferences if the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1,
but even with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to 2, the riskless rate drops by 3.5 per
cent.
3experimental estimates of   and , and are of particular interest because there is little
agreement about the value of  . (Campbell (2003) summarizes the conicting evidence.)
I also show how good-deal bounds (Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo (2000)) can be used to
provide upper bounds on risk aversion, based once again on the fundamental quantities,
without calibrating a consumption process.
This theme of making inferences from observable fundamentals without making as-
sumptions about the tails of consumption growth recurs in Section IV. I consider the
question, surveyed by Lucas (2003), of the cost of consumption risk. This cost turns
out to depend on  and   and on two observables: mean consumption growth and the
consumption-wealth ratio. The cost does not depend on risk aversion other than (implic-
itly) through the consumption-wealth ratio, which summarizes all relevant information
about the attitude to risk of the representative agent and the amount of risk in the
economy, as perceived by the representative agent.
In the power utility case, these welfare calculations apply to any consumption growth
process, i.i.d. or not. My results therefore generalize Lucas (1987), Obstfeld (1994) and
Barro (2006b). Unlike these authors, I view the consumption-wealth ratio as an observ-
able. Using Barro's preferred preference parameters, I nd that the cost of consumption
uctuations is about 14 per cent. I also calculate the welfare gains from a reduction in
the variance of consumption growth, and show that almost all the cost of uncertainty
can be attributed to the higher cumulants of consumption growth.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) modify the textbook
model along dierent dimensions. This paper explores dierent features, and implica-
tions, of the data, so is complementary to their work. In particular, both Campbell
and Cochrane (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) take care to work in a lognormal
framework. It would, of course, be interesting to extend these papers by allowing for
the possibility of jumps, but doing so would obscure the main point of this paper.
A large body of literature applies L evy processes to derivative pricing (Carr and
Madan (1998), Cont and Tankov (2004)) and portfolio choice (Kallsen (2000), Cvitani c,
Polimenis and Zapatero (2005), A t-Sahalia, Cacho-Diaz and Hurd (2006)). Lustig, Van
4Nieuwerburgh and Verdelhan (2008) present estimates of the wealth-consumption ratio.
Backus, Foresi and Telmer (2001) derive expressions relating cumulants to risk premia,
though their approach is very dierent from that taken here. An alternative to the
approach of this paper is to evaluate disaster models by considering a wider range of
asset prices than typically considered in the consumption-based asset pricing literature.
In this spirit, Julliard and Ghosh (2008) argue that the cross-section of asset price data is
hard to square with disaster explanations of the equity premium, and Backus, Chernov
and Martin (2009) explore the evidence in option prices.
I Asset-pricing and the cumulant-generating func-
tion
Dene Gt  logCt=C0 and write G  G1. I make two assumptions.
A1 There is a representative agent with Epstein-Zin preferences, time preference rate
, relative risk aversion , and elasticity of intertemporal substitution  .
A2 The consumption growth, logCt=Ct 1, of the representative agent is i.i.d.,2 and the
moment-generating function of G (dened below) exists on the interval [ ;1].3
Assumption A1 allows risk aversion  to be disentangled from the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution  . To keep things simple, those calculations that appear in the
main text restrict to the power utility case in which   is constrained to equal 1=; in













 t logCt if  = 1: (1)
2Really, all that we need is that the representative agent perceives himself as having i.i.d. consumption
growth and prices assets accordingly; the results of the paper go through without modication.
3If not, the consumption-based asset-pricing approach is invalid. This assumption implies, for ex-
ample, that all moments of G are nite. See Billingsley (1995, Section 21).
5Cogley (1990) and Barro (2006b) present evidence in support of A2 in the form of
variance-ratio statistics close to one, on average, across nine (Cogley) or 19 (Barro)
countries.










    < 1 if  6= 1: (2)
I discuss this requirement further below.
The Euler equation relates the price of an asset this period to the payo next period.

































Finally, allowing T ! 1 (and imposing the no-bubble condition that the second term














I start by considering an asset which pays dividend stream Dt  (Ct) for some
constant  (the -asset). The central cases of interest will later be  = 0 (the riskless
bond) and  = 1 (the wealth portfolio which pays consumption as its dividend), but, as
in Campbell (1986) and Abel (1999), it is possible to view values  > 1 as a tractable
way of modelling levered claims. I write P for the price of this asset at time 0, and D











































The last equality follows from the assumption that log consumption growth is i.i.d. To
make further progress, I now introduce a pair of denitions.
Denition 1. Given some arbitrary random variable, G, the moment-generating func-
tion m() and cumulant-generating function or CGF c() are dened by
m()  Eexp(G) (5)
c()  logm(); (6)
for all  for which the expectation in (5) is nite.
Here, G is an annual increment of log consumption, G = logCt+1 logCt. Notice that
c(0) = 0 for any growth process and that c(1) is equal to log mean gross consumption
growth, so c(1)  2%. The CGF summarizes information about the cumulants (or,







and dene n to be the nth cumulant of log consumption growth. A small amount of
algebra conrms that, for example, 1   is the mean, 2  2 the variance, 3=3
the skewness and 4=4 the kurtosis of log consumption growth. Knowledge of the
cumulants of a random variable implies knowledge of the moments, and vice versa.
4See Appendix A for further details.









It is convenient to dene the log dividend yield d=p  log(1 + D=P).5 Then,
d=p =    c(   ) (7)
Two special cases are of particular interest. The rst is  = 0, in which case the asset
in question is the riskless bond, whose dividend yield is the riskless rate. The second
is  = 1, in which case the asset pays consumption as its dividend, and can therefore
be interpreted as aggregate wealth. The dividend yield is then the consumption-wealth
ratio.
This calculation also shows that the necessary restriction on consumption growth
for the expected utility to be well dened in (2) is that  > c(1   ), or equivalently
that the consumption-wealth ratio is positive. When the condition fails, the standard
consumption-based asset pricing approach is no longer valid.
The gross return on the -asset is (dropping  subscripts for clarity)


















and thus the expected gross return is















5It is worth emphasizing that log dividend yield, as I have dened it, is a number close to D=P,
since log(1 + x)  x for small x. d=p is not the same as d   p as used elsewhere in the literature to
mean logD=P.
8Once again, it turns out to be more convenient to work with log expected gross
return, er  log(1 + ERt+1) =  + c()   c(   ).
Proposition 1 (Fundamental quantities, power utility case). The riskless rate, rf 
log(1 + Rf), consumption-wealth ratio, c=w  log(1 + C=W), and risk premium on
aggregate wealth, rp  er1   rf, are given by
rf =    c( ) (9)
c=w =    c(1   ) (10)
rp = c(1) + c( )   c(1   ): (11)
Writing these quantities explicitly in terms of the underlying cumulants by expanding
c() in power series form, we obtain
























Writing the rst few terms of the series out more explicitly, (12) implies that












4 + higher order terms:
By denition of the rst four cumulants, this can be rewritten as















4+higher order terms: (15)
In the lognormal case, the skewness, excess kurtosis and all higher cumulants are zero,
so (15) reduces to the familiar rf =  +    22=2. More generally, the riskless rate
is low if mean log consumption growth  is low (an intertemporal substitution eect);
if the variance of log consumption growth 2 is high (a precautionary savings eect); if
there is negative skewness; or if there is a high degree of kurtosis.
9Similarly, the consumption-wealth ratio (13) can be rewritten as
















4 + higher order terms: (16)
In the log utility case,  = 1, the consumption-wealth ratio is determined only by
the rate of time preference: c=w = . If  6= 1, the consumption-wealth ratio is low
when cumulants of even order are large (high variance, high kurtosis, and so on). The
importance of cumulants of odd order depends on whether  is greater or less than 1.
In the empirically more plausible case  > 1, the consumption-wealth ratio is low when
odd cumulants are low: when mean log consumption growth is low, or when there is
negative skewness, for example. If the representative agent is more risk-tolerant than log,
the reverse is true: the consumption-wealth ratio is high when mean log consumption
growth is low, or when there is negative skewness.

















4   (1   )
4
+ higher order terms: (17)
In the lognormal case, this is just rp = 2. Since 1 + n   (1   )n > 0 for even n,
the risk premium is increasing in variance, excess kurtosis and higher cumulants of even
order. The eect of skewness and higher cumulants of odd order depends on . For
odd n, 1   n   (1   )n is positive if  < 1, zero if  = 1, and negative if  > 1. If
 = 1, skewness and higher odd-order cumulants have no eect on the risk premium.
Otherwise, the risk premium is decreasing in skewness and higher odd cumulants if  > 1
and increasing if  < 1.
The following result generalizes Proposition 1 to allow for Epstein-Zin preferences.
Proposition 2 (Epstein-Zin case). Dening #  (1   )=(1   1= ), we have







c=w =    c(1   )=# (19)
rp = c(1) + c( )   c(1   ); (20)
10and the counterparts of (12){(14) that result on expanding (18){(20) as power series.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Equation (19) reveals that if  > 1 and   > 1|as in the calibration of Bansal
and Yaron (2004)|so # < 0, the comparative statics for the consumption-wealth ratio
that were discussed above are reversed: a high variance or kurtosis leads to a high
consumption-wealth ratio.
Equation (20) shows as expected that when the CGF is linear|that is, when con-
sumption growth is deterministic|there is no risk premium. Roughly speaking, the
CGF of the driving consumption process must have a signicant amount of convexity
over the range [ ;1] to generate an empirically reasonable risk premium. It also con-
rms that risk aversion alone inuences the risk premium: the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is not a factor.
Expressions (12){(14), and their analogues in the Epstein-Zin case, can in principle be
estimated directly by estimating the cumulants of log consumption, given a suciently
long data sample, without imposing any further structure on the model. If, say, the high
equity premium results from the occasional occurrence of severe disasters, this will show
up in the cumulants. Other than (A1) and (A2), no assumption need be made about
the arrival rate or distribution of disasters, nor of any other feature of the consumption
process.
In practice, of course, we cannot estimate innitely many cumulants from a nite
data set. One solution to this is to impose some particular distribution on log consump-
tion growth, and then to estimate the parameters of the distribution. An alternative
approach, more in the spirit of model-independence, is to approximate the equations
by truncating after the rst N cumulants, N being determined by the amount of data
available. (In this context it is worth noting that the assumption that consumption
growth is lognormal is equivalent to truncating at N = 2, since, as noted above, when
log consumption growth is Normal all cumulants above the variance are equal to zero|
that is, n = 0 for n greater than 2.) For reasons given in the Introduction and discussed
further in Section II.A below, I do not follow this route.
11I.A The Gordon growth model
From equations (18){(20), we see that
c=w = rp + rf   c(1): (21)
This is a version of the traditional Gordon growth model. For example, the last term
of (21), c(1) = logECt+1=Ct, measures mean consumption growth. Only three of the
riskless rate, risk premium, consumption-wealth ratio and mean consumption growth
can be independently specied: the fourth is mechanically determined by (21).
This observation, together with equations (18){(20), provides another way to look at
Kocherlakota's (1990) point. In principle, given sucient asset price and consumption
data, we could determine the riskless rate, the risk premium, and CGF c() to any
desired level of accuracy. Since  is the only preference parameter that determines the
risk premium, it could be calculated from (20), given knowledge of c(). On the other
hand, knowledge of the riskless rate leaves  and   indeterminate in equation (18),
even given knowledge of  and c(). That is, the time discount rate and elasticity of
intertemporal substitution cannot be disentangled on the basis of the four fundamental
quantities alone. On the other hand, as noted in the introduction, the use of Epstein-
Zin preferences aids the interpretation of results and allows for a richer set of possible
comparative statics.
I.B The asymptotic lognormality of consumption
If G has mean  and (nite) variance 2, the central limit theorem shows that consump-






6Informally, Gt   t is typically O(
p
t), so for positive , P(Gt   t  t) ! 0 as t ! 1, or
equivalently, P(Ct  C0e(+)t) ! 0. The Cram er-Cherno theorem tells us how fast this probability










12It therefore appears that if one measures over very long periods, only the rst two
cumulants will be needed to capture information about consumption growth. Why,
then, does the representative agent care about cumulants of log consumption growth





For example, SFC3 is skewness and SFC4 is kurtosis. These scale-free cumulants are
normalized to be invariant if the underlying random variable is scaled by some constant
factor. Since the (unscaled) cumulants of Gt are linear in t, the nth scale-free cumulant
of Gt is proportional to t  t n=2 = t(2 n)=2 and so tends to zero for n greater than 2.
The asymptotic Normality of (Gt   t)=
p
t is reected in the fact that its scale-free
cumulants of orders greater than two tend to zero as t tends to innity. But in terms of
the scale-free cumulants, the riskless rate (for example) can be expressed as











Thus, even though skewness, kurtosis and higher scale-free cumulants tend to zero as
the period length is allowed to increase, the relevant asset-pricing equation scales these
variables by |and this tends to innity as period length increases, in such a way that
higher cumulants remain relevant.
II The continuous-time case
For the purposes of constructing concrete examples, it is convenient to conrm that the
simplicity of the above framework carries over to the continuous-time case.










Van der Vaart (1998) has a proof.














 t logCt if  = 1 (23)
A2c The log consumption path, Gt, of the representative agent follows a L evy process,
and m() exists for  in [ ;1].







which follows from Assumption A2c; see Sato (1999) for detailed discussion of L evy
processes.
The following proposition shows that the discrete-time results go through almost
unchanged, except that the equations that previously held for log dividend yields, the
log riskless rate and the log risk premium now apply to the instantaneous dividend yield,
the instantaneous riskless rate and the instantaneous risk premium. The proof, which
is very similar to the discrete-time calculations, is omitted.
Proposition 3 (Reprise of earlier results). The riskless rate, Rf, consumption-wealth
ratio, C=W, and risk premium on aggregate wealth, RP  ER1   Rf, are given by
Rf =    c( )
C=W =    c(1   )
RP = c(1) + c( )   c(1   ):
The Gordon growth model holds:
D=P = ER   c():
7For simplicity, I restrict to the power utility case, although the analysis could be easily generalized
to allow for the continuous-time analogue of Epstein-Zin preferences (Due and Epstein (1992)).
14II.A A concrete example: disasters
To aid intuition, it is helpful to demonstrate the above results in the context of a partic-
ular model. In this section, I show how to derive a convenient continuous-time version of
Barro (2006a). I use the model to show that i.i.d. disaster models make predictions for
the fundamentals that are sensitively dependent on the parameter values assumed. In
particular, making disasters more frequent or more severe drives the riskless rate down
sharply.
Suppose that log consumption follows the jump-diusion process




where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, N(t) is a Poisson counting process with pa-
rameter ! and Yi are i.i.d. random variables with some arbitrary distribution. The
signicance of this example is that any L evy process can be approximated arbitrarily
accurately by a process of the form (25). I will assume that all moments of the disaster
size Y1 are nite, from which it follows that all moments of G are nite.









separating the expectation into two separate products is legitimate since the Poisson
jumps and Yi are independent of the Brownian component Bt. The middle term is the
expectation of a lognormal random variable: EeBB1 = e2
B2=2. The nal term is slightly
more complicated, but can be evaluated by conditioning on the number of jumps that































= expf! (mY1()   1)g ;
15So, nally, we have
c() = e  + 
2
B
2=2 + ! (mY1()   1) : (26)
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e  + ! EY n = 1
2
B + ! EY 2 n = 2
! EY n n  3
Take the case in which Y  N( b;s2); b is assumed to be greater than zero, so the
jumps represent disasters. The CGF is then






























(1 − γ) (−γ)
c/w c(1)
Figure 1: The CGF in equation (27) shown with and without (! = 0) jumps. The gure
assumes that  = 4.
Figure 1 shows the CGF of (27) plotted against . I set parameters which correspond
to Barro's (2006a) baseline calibration| = 4;B = 0:02; = 0:03; e  = 0:025;! =
0:017|and choose b = 0:39 and s = 0:25 to match the mean and variance of the
distribution of jumps used in the same paper. I also plot the CGF that results in the
absence of jumps (! = 0). In the latter case, I adjust the drift of consumption growth
to keep mean log consumption growth constant.
16The riskless rate, consumption-wealth ratio and mean consumption growth can be
read directly o the graph, as indicated by the arrows. The risk premium can be
calculated from these three via the Gordon growth formula (rp = c=w + c(1)   rf), or
read directly o the graph as follows. Draw one line from ( ;c( )) to (1;c(1)) and
another from (1   ;c(1   )) to (0;0). The midpoint of the rst line lies above the
midpoint of the second by convexity of the CGF. The risk premium is twice the distance
from one midpoint to the other. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.













(1 − γ) (−γ)
Figure 2: The risk premium. The gure assumes that  = 4.
The standard lognormal model predicts a counterfactually high riskless rate; in Fig-
ure 1, this is reected in the fact that the no-jumps CGF lies well below  for reasonable
values of . Similarly, the standard lognormal model predicts a counterfactually low eq-
uity premium. In Figure 1, this manifests itself in a no-jump CGF which is practically
linear over the relevant range and which is upward-sloping between   and 1 . Con-
versely, the disaster CGF has a shape which allows it to match observed fundamentals
closely.
Zooming out on Figure 1, we obtain Figure 3, which further illustrates the equity
premium and riskless rate puzzles. With jumps, the CGF is visible at the right-hand
side of the gure; the CGF explodes so quickly as  declines that it is only visible for
 greater than about  5. The jump-free lognormal CGF has incredibly low curvature.
For a realistic riskless rate and equity premium, the model requires a risk aversion above


















Figure 3: Zooming out to see the equity premium and riskless rate puzzles. The dashed
box in the upper right-hand corner is the boundary of the region plotted in Figure 1.
80.
With the explicit expression (27) for the CGF in hand, it is easy to investigate the
sensitivity of a disaster model's predictions to the parameter values assumed. Table I
shows how changes in the calibration of the distribution of disasters aect the relevant
fundamentals and the cost of consumption uncertainty, . I consider the power utility
case, with  = 0:03 and  = 4, and also the Epstein-Zin case, with the same time-
preference rate and risk aversion but higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
  = 1:5, following Bansal and Yaron (2004). As is evident from the table, small changes
in any of the parameters !, b or s have large eects on the equity premium (and,
with power utility, on the riskless rate; this eect is muted in the Epstein-Zin case).
Given that these parameters are hard to estimate|disasters happen very rarely|this
is problematic.
An important dierence between the power utility and Epstein-Zin cases is that
increasing risk in the economy leads to lower consumption-wealth ratios in the power
utility case, and higher consumption-wealth ratios in the Epstein-Zin case. Bansal and
Yaron (2004) emphasize this feature in a model without disasters, and argue that it
supports an elasticity of substitution greater than 1.
Table II investigates the consequences of truncating the CGF at the nth cumulant.
18! b s Rf C=W RP R
f C=W  RP 
Baseline case 0.017 0.39 0.25 1.0 4.8 5.7 -0.9 2.8 5.7
High ! 0.022 -2.4 3.1 7.4 -2.5 3.0 7.4
Low ! 0.012 4.5 6.4 4.1 0.7 2.6 4.1
High b 0.44 -1.9 3.6 7.5 -2.6 2.9 7.5
Low b 0.34 3.5 5.8 4.4 0.4 2.7 4.4
High s 0.30 -2.2 3.8 8.1 -3.1 2.9 8.1
Low s 0.20 3.2 5.5 4.2 0.5 2.7 4.2
Table I: The impact of dierent assumptions about the distribution of disasters. e  =
0:025,  = 0:02. Unasterisked group assumes power utility,  = 0:03,  = 4. Asterisked
group assumes Epstein-Zin preferences,  = 0:03,  = 4,   = 1:5.
(The risk premium calculation applies in either the power utility or Epstein-Zin case; the
riskless rate and consumption-wealth ratio calculations only apply in the power utility
case.) When n = 2, this is equivalent to making a lognormality assumption, as noted
above. With n = 3, it can be thought of as an approximation which accounts for the
inuence of skewness; n = 4 also allows for kurtosis. As is clear from the table, however,
much of the action is due to cumulants of fth order and higher. This suggests that
one should not expect calculations based on third- or fourth-order approximations to
capture fully the inuence of disasters.
III Restrictions on preference parameters
Any three of the riskless rate, consumption-wealth ratio, risk premium and expected
consumption growth pin down the value of the fourth, via the Gordon growth model
c=w = rf + rp   c(1) given in (21). I now assume that these quantities are observable,
and take the values given in Table III.
We have seen, too, that the riskless rate, risk premium and consumption-wealth ratio
tell us information about the shape of the CGF. I now show how to exploit this observa-
19n Rf C=W RP
1 10.3 8.5 0.0 deterministic
2 7.1 6.7 1.6 lognormal
3 4.7 5.7 3.0
4 3.0 5.1 4.1
1 1.0 4.8 5.7 true model
Table II: The impact of approximating the disaster model by truncating at the nth
cumulant. All parameters as in baseline power utility case of Table I.
riskless rate rf 0.02
risk premium rp 0.06
consumption-wealth ratio c=w 0.06
mean consumption growth c(1) 0.02
Table III: Assumed values of the observables.
tion to nd restrictions on preference parameters, in terms of observable fundamentals,
that must hold in any Epstein-Zin/i.i.d. model, no matter what pattern of (say) rare
disasters we allow ourselves to entertain.
Since for example rf =  c( ) in the power utility case, observation of the riskless
rate tells us something about  and something about the value taken by the CGF at
 . Similarly, observation of the consumption-wealth ratio tells us something about 
and something about the value taken by the CGF at 1   . Next, c(1) = logE(C1=C0)
is pinned down by mean consumption growth, and c(0) = 0 by denition. How, though,
can we get control on the enormous range of possible consumption processes? One
approach is to exploit the fact that the CGF of any random variable is convex:
Fact 1. CGFs are convex.
20Proof. Since c() = logm(), we have
c
00() =







The numerator of this expression is positive by a version of the Cauchy-Schwartz in-
equality which states that EX2EY 2  E(jXY j)2 for any random variables X and Y . In
this case, we need to set X = eG=2 and Y = GeG=2. (See Billingsley (1995), for further
discussion of CGFs.)
The following result exploits this convexity to derive bounds on preference parame-
ters, based on the observables, that are valid no matter what is going on in the higher
cumulants.
Proposition 4. In the power utility case, we have
rf   c=w 
c=w   
   1
 rp + rf   c=w (28)
In the Epstein-Zin case, we have
rf   c=w 
c=w   
1=    1
 rp + rf   c=w (29)
Proof. From equation (19) we have, in the Epstein-Zin case,
c=w   












to see this, note that if f() is a convex function passing through zero, then f()= is





1=    1
 c(1):
21After some rearrangement of the left-hand inequality using (18) and (19), and substi-
tuting out for c(1) using the Gordon growth model (21), we get (29). Equation (28)
follows since  = 1=  in the power utility case.
The intuition for the result is that as   approaches one, the consumption-wealth
ratio approaches . Therefore, when the consumption-wealth ratio is far from ,   must
be far from one. Using the empirically reasonable values rp = 6%;rf = 2%;c=w = 6%,
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if    1:
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate these constraints. If   is greater than one,  is constrained
to lie between 0.02 and 0.08; if also   is less than two,  must lie between 0.04 and 0.07.












γ and ρ in here
or in here
(a) Power utility case:  and 












ψ and ρ in here
or in here
(b) Epstein-Zin case:   and 
Figure 4: Parameter restrictions for i.i.d. models with rp = 6%, rf = 2% and log
expected consumption growth of 2%.
III.A Hansen-Jagannathan and good-deal bounds
The restrictions in Proposition 4 are complementary to the bound derived by Hansen and
Jagannathan (1991), which relates the standard deviation and mean of the stochastic















ec( 2) 2c( )   1; (31)





 c( 2)   2c( ): (32)
Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo (2000) observe that inequality (30) suggests a natural
way to restrict asset-pricing models. Suppose (M)=EM  h; then (30) implies that
the maximal Sharpe ratio is less than h. In CGF notation, the good-deal bound is that





Suppose, for example, that we wish to impose the restriction that Sharpe ratios
above 100% are too good a deal to be available. Then the good-deal bound is c( 2) 
2c( )  log2. This expression can be evaluated under particular parametric assump-
tions about the consumption process. In the case in which consumption growth is
lognormal, with volatility of log consumption equal to , it supplies an upper bound on
risk aversion:  
p
log2= (which is about 42 if  = 0:02). However, this upper bound
is rather weak, and in any case the postulated consumption process is inconsistent with
observed features of asset markets such as the high equity premium and low riskless rate.
Alternatively, one might model the consumption process as subject to disasters in
the sense of Section II.A. In this case, the good-deal bound implies tighter restrictions
on , but these restrictions are sensitively dependent on the disaster parameters.
In order to progress from (33) to a bound on  and  which does not require
parametrization of the consumption process, we want to relate c( 2) 2c( ) to quan-
tities which can be directly observed. For example, the Hansen-Jagannathan bound (32)
23improves on a conclusion which follows from the convexity of the CGF, namely, that
0  c( 2)   2c( ): (34)
This trivial inequality follows by considering the value of the CGF at the three points
c(0), c( ), and c( 2). Convexity implies that the average slope of the CGF is more
negative (or less positive) between  2 and   than it is between   and 0. To be







from which (34) follows immediately, given that c(0) = 0. Combining (33) and (34), we






However, we can sharpen (34) by comparing the slope of the CGF between  2 and
  to the slope between   and 1  (as opposed to that between   and 0). Making




c(1   )   c( )
1
;
from which it follows that
c( 2)   2c( )  (   1)c( )   c(1   )






e( 1)(c=w rf)+#(c=w )   1: (36)
Proposition 5. If the maximal Sharpe ratio is less than or equal to h, then we must
have






























Figure 5: Restrictions on  and  implied by good-deal bounds in the power utility case
with c=w = 0:06;rf = 0:02.
Working with the power utility case for simplicity (# = 1) and setting c=w =
0:06;rf = 0:02, Figure 5 shows the upper bounds on  that result for various dier-
ent h. Lower values of h imply tighter restrictions. When h = 1|ruling out Sharpe
ratios above 100%|we have   16:8 + 25. So if  = 0:03,  < 17:6.
Alternatively, we could take the approach suggested at the end of the previous section,
by setting  = c=w. In the general (Epstein-Zin) case, equation (37) then implies the
restriction




(To avoid unnecessary complication I have imposed the empirically relevant case c=w 
rf.) Setting c=w = 0:06, rf = 0:02, and h = 1, this implies that  < 18:4.
The important feature of the bounds (37) and (38) is that by exploiting the observable
consumption-wealth ratio and riskless rate, they do not require one to take a stand on
the hard-to-estimate higher cumulants of consumption growth.
IV The cost of consumption uctuations
Continuing with the theme of extracting information from observable fundamentals, I
now explore the implications of the consumption-wealth ratio for estimates of the cost of
25consumption uctuations in the style of Lucas (1987), Obstfeld (1994) or Barro (2006b).
A starting point is the close correspondence between expected utility and the price






































This correspondence between expected utility and the consumption-wealth ratio, and
hence (39), does not have a meaningful analogue in the log utility case. In a sense,
the consumption-wealth ratio is less informative in the log utility case since it is pinned
down by the time discount rate, C=W = e   1.











;  6= 1: (40)
When  < 1 the representative agent prefers large values of c(1 ) and when  > 1 the
representative agent prefers small values of c(1   ). When  > 1, the representative
agent likes positive mean and positive skew and positive cumulants of odd orders but
dislikes large values of variance, kurtosis and cumulants of even orders; when  < 1 the
representative agent likes large means, large variances, large skewness, large kurtosis|
large positive values of cumulants of all orders.8
Equation (39) gives expected utility under the status quo; expression (40) permits
the calculation of expected utility under alternative consumption processes with their
corresponding CGFs. I compare two quantities: expected utility with initial consump-
tion (1 + )C0 and the status quo consumption growth process,9 and expected utility
with initial consumption C0 and the alternative consumption growth process. The cost
8As always, these cumulants are the cumulants of log consumption growth. This explains the result
that risk-averse agents with  < 1 prefer large variances, which may initially seem counterintuitive.
9Since the consumption growth process is unchanged, the consumption-wealth ratio remains con-
stant. The increase in initial consumption therefore corresponds to an increase in initial wealth by
proportion .
26of uncertainty is the value of  which equates the two. This denition follows the lead
of Lucas (1987) and Obstfeld (1994) and Section V of Alvarez and Jermann (2004).
The following sections consider two possible counterfactuals: (i) a scenario in which
all uncertainty is eliminated, and (ii) a scenario in which the variance of consumption
growth is reduced by 2 but higher cumulants are unchanged. In each case, mean
consumption growth ECt+1=Ct is held constant.
IV.A The elimination of all uncertainty
Since E(C1=C0) = ec(1), keeping mean consumption growth constant is equivalent to
holding c(1) = logE(C1=C0) constant. If all uncertainty is also to be eliminated, log
consumption follows the trivial L evy process Gt whose CGF is cG() = c(1) for all .






































What assumptions are required to derive (42)? The left-hand side of (41) relies on
the correspondence between expected utility and the consumption-wealth ratio that was
noted at the beginning of section IV. This correspondence follows directly from Lucas's
(1978) Euler equation with power utility: the assumption that real-world consumption
growth is i.i.d. is not required. The cost of all uncertainty given in (42) depends only
on the power utility assumption. The counterfactual case of deterministic growth is
trivially i.i.d., so it is convenient to work with a CGF, though not necessary. (Below, I
calculate the benet associated with a reduction in the variance of consumption growth,
while higher moments remain constant. In this case, the i.i.d. assumption is required
and CGFs are central to my calculations.)
In the Epstein-Zin case it is also necessary to rely on the i.i.d. assumption. It turns
out that (42) is misleading in that the  terms that appear in it are capturing not risk
27aversion but the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, as the following proposition
shows.
Proposition 6. In the Epstein-Zin case with elasticity of intertemporal substitution  ,





















With power utility and  6= 1, the above equation holds, even in the absence of the
i.i.d. assumption, with 1=  replaced by .
With log utility we do require the i.i.d. assumption, and have
 = exp[(c(1)   )=(e








Proof. See appendix B for the Epstein-Zin calculations.
Proposition 6 shows that if the mean consumption growth rate in levels, consumption-
wealth ratio and preference parameters  and   can be estimated accurately, then the
gains notionally available from eliminating all uncertainty can be estimated without
needing to make assumptions about the particular stochastic process followed by con-
sumption. In particular, in the Epstein-Zin case,  is not|directly|dependent on ,
nor on estimates of the variance (and higher cumulants) of consumption growth. The
consumption-wealth ratio encodes all relevant information about the amount of risk
(that is, the cumulants n, n  2) and the representative agent's attitude to risk ().
In the power utility case in particular, this result is rather general. It applies to arbi-
trary consumption processes and so nests results obtained by Lucas (1987, 2003), Obst-
feld (1994) and Barro (2006b).10 The important feature is that I treat the consumption-
wealth ratio as an observable. Lucas, Obstfeld and Barro postulate some particular
10Lucas (1987, 2003) assumes that current consumption C0 is not known in the risky case. I follow
Alvarez and Jermann (2004) in assuming that C0 is known. The distinction is quantitatively insignicant
in practice.
28consumption process and, implicitly or explicitly, calculate the consumption-wealth ra-
tio implied by that consumption process. For these authors, a change in  is accompanied
by a change in C=W; I, on the other hand, hold C=W constant and view it as containing
information about the underlying consumption process.
IV.A.1 The cost of uncertainty with power utility
As before, suppose that c=w = 0:06 and c(1) = 0:02, and that  = 0:03 and  = 4.
Substituting these values into (42) gives   14%. This cost estimate is roughly two
orders of magnitude higher than that obtained by Lucas (1987, 2003), even allowing
for the higher risk aversion assumed in this paper. Although Lucas's calculations do
not make use of the observable consumption-wealth ratio, it is possible to calculate
the consumption-wealth ratio implied by his assumptions on the consumption process
and my assumptions on  and ; the result is an implied consumption-wealth ratio
c=w = 0:0896. Substituting this value back into (42), we recover the far lower cost
estimate,   0:14%. Once one considers the consumption-wealth ratio as an observable,
the cost of uncertainty appears to be considerably higher.
  c(1) c=w 
Baseline case 0.03 4 0.02 0.06 14%
High  0.04 18%
Low  0.02 10%
High  5 16%
Low  3 7.7%
High growth 0.025 20%
Low growth 0.015 7.5%
High c=w 0.07 8.4%
Low c=w 0.05 21%
Table IV: The cost of consumption uctuations with power utility.
Table IV shows how dierent assumptions on preference parameters and on mean
29consumption growth and the consumption-wealth ratio aect the estimate of the cost
of uncertainty. Apart from the last two lines of the table, the consumption-wealth ratio
c=w is held constant in the calculations.
The cost of uncertainty is higher when agents are more impatient (high ). When
 is low, the (relatively) high consumption-wealth ratio signals that there is not too
much risk in the economy. When  is high, the (relatively) low consumption-wealth
ratio signals that there is considerable risk in the economy, or that risk aversion is high.
The case in which  varies is somewhat more complicated. Suppose, rst, that  is
low relative to c=w, as in the above table. If we imagine holding the level of risk constant,
then increasing  from a low level will lead, rst, to an increase in c=w because the rep-
resentative agent is less inclined to substitute consumption intertemporally. Ultimately,
however, increasing  must lead to a decrease in c=w, once the precautionary saving
motive starts to dominate. (These statements are most easily understood if one keeps
Figure 1 in mind.) Turning the logic around, if  increases but c=w remains constant,
the level of risk in the economy must rst be increasing and then declining. It follows
that we may expect increases in  to have ambiguous eects on the cost of uncertainty,
holding c=w constant. In Table IV, the former eect dominates.
When, on the other hand,  is large relative to c=w, the CGF must have signicant
curvature|look at Figure 1. It follows that there is considerable risk in the economy; in
this case, for  to increase while c=w remains constant, it can only be that the level of
risk is declining. Thus we expect to see that for low values of , the cost of uncertainty is
rst increasing and then decreasing in , while for larger values of , the cost is declining
in .
These observations are borne out by Figure 6. When  = 0:03, the cost of uncertainty
is rst increasing and then decreasing in . When  = 0:06 or 0.09, the cost of uncertainty
is decreasing in .
Finally, when  equals 0.03,  must be at least 2.5 to be consistent with the assumed
mean consumption growth and consumption-wealth ratio. In Figure 6, the black line
hits zero at  = 2:5 because the only possibility consistent with  = 0:03; = 2:5;c(1) =







Figure 6: The cost of consumption uncertainty plotted against risk aversion, , when
 = 0:03 (in black),  = 0:06 (in red) and  = 0:09 (in blue). The cost of uncertainty
ultimately declines as  increases: for very high values of , c=w can only equal 0.06 if
there is relatively little risk in consumption growth.
0:02;c=w = 0:06 is that consumption is deterministic.
IV.A.2 The cost of uncertainty with Epstein-Zin preferences
Figure 7a illustrates the eects of changes in  and   on the cost of uncertainty. When
 is high, the cost is high, for the same reasons as above. It is not possible to set  
and  arbitrarily while retaining consistency with observed values of the consumption-
wealth ratio. In Figure 7a, we see that we cannot have   between 0.4 and 1 if  = 0:03.
However, if  = c=w, then   can take any value. Figure 7b therefore sets  = c=w and
shows that the cost of uncertainty increases in  . When   is around one, the implied
cost of uncertainty is high, at about 40% of current wealth.
IV.B A reduction in the variance of consumption growth
The preceding section showed that there are signicant costs due to uncertainty. This
section investigates the utility benet of a reduction in variance of 2, holding all higher
cumulants xed. (It is possible to adjust variance alone, leaving higher cumulants un-
changed, because the Brownian component of log consumption growth only aects the
second cumulant.)







(a) Against  , with  = 0:03 (in black),  =
0:06 (in red) and  = 0:09 (in blue).







(b) Against  , with  = c=w = 0:06.
Figure 7: The cost of uncertainty with Epstein-Zin preferences.
Under the new reduced-volatility process, the CGF is




The term of order 2 decreases the variance of log consumption growth by 2. The term
of order  adjusts the drift of log consumption growth to hold mean consumption growth
constant in levels, that is, to ensure that e c(1) = c(1).

















e e c(1 )   1
:
Substituting in from (44), and replacing  c(1 ) with the observable c=w = log(1+












Carrying out similar calculations in the Epstein-Zin case, we nd
Proposition 7. In the Epstein-Zin case with elasticity of intertemporal substitution  ,
a reduction in consumption variance of 2 is equivalent in utility terms to a proportional














32In the power utility case, the above equation holds with 1=  replaced by .


























Proof. See Appendix B for the Epstein-Zin calculations.
Obstfeld (1994) observes that (47) holds in the power utility case with i.i.d. lognormal
consumption growth, but does not show that it holds in the Epstein-Zin case or for
general i.i.d. consumption processes.
With  = 4, and setting c=w = 0:06 as usual, it follows from (47) that a reduction in
variance of 0:0003|as would be associated with a decline in the standard deviation of
log consumption growth from 2% to 1%|is equivalent in welfare terms to an increase
in current consumption (or equivalently wealth) of 1.0%. These calculations suggest, by
comparison with the calculations of the previous subsection, that most of the cost of
uncertainty can be attributed to higher-order cumulants.
V Conclusion
As pointed out by Rietz (1988), Barro (2006a) and Weitzman (2007), the tails of the
distribution of consumption growth exert an enormous inuence on asset prices. In this
paper, I have taken an agnostic approach to the existence and importance of disasters
by introducing a framework that handles general i.i.d. consumption growth processes.
I showed that the predictions of disaster models are sensitively dependent on the as-
sumptions made about the parameters governing the size and frequency of disasters.
33This is problematic, because these parameters cannot be accurately estimated given the
available data. I sidestepped this problem by deriving results that are valid no matter
what is going on in the tails of consumption growth. In particular, these results do not
depend on any assumptions about the size|or indeed existence|of disasters.
First, I derived bounds on the time preference rate and elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution, which are of central importance in an wide range of economic mod-
els. The bounds depend on observed values of the riskless rate, risk premium, and
consumption-wealth ratio. Second, I showed that good-deal bounds can be combined
with the consumption-wealth ratio and riskless rate to provide bounds on risk aver-
sion for given time preference rate and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Third,
I showed, under assumptions more general than those made by Lucas (1987), Obstfeld
(1994) or Barro (2006b), that it is possible to use the observed consumption-wealth ratio
to estimate the welfare cost of uncertainty without specifying a consumption process. I
estimate that the cost of uncertainty is on the order of 14%, and that almost all of this
cost can be attributed to higher cumulants.
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A Cumulants and cumulant-generating functions
This section lays out some important properties of cumulant-generating functions. It
turns out that c() can be thought of as a power series in  that encodes the cumulants
(equivalently, moments) of consumption growth. To preview the main result, we have













 and  denote the unconditional mean and standard deviation of log consumption
growth.
Denition 2. The cumulants of G are the coecients n in the power series expansion







Proposition 8. We have the following properties.
1. EG = 1; varG = 2  2; skewness(G) = 3=3; excess kurtosis(G) = 4=4.
2. For any two independent random variables G and H, n(G+H) = n(G)+n(H)
and cG+H() = cG() + cH().
3. 1(G) = c0
G(0); 2(G) = c00
G(0); n(G) = c
(n)
G (0).
4. n is a polynomial in the rst n moments of G(and the nth moment of G is a
polynomial in the rst n cumulants of G).
Proof. See Billingsley (1995, section 9).
B Calculations with Epstein-Zin preferences













where # = (1 )=(1 1= ) and Rm;0!t is the cumulative return on the wealth portfolio
from period 0 to period t. I assume that   6= 1 for convenience.
Now,




















where the last equality follows by making the assumption|provisional for the time being,
but subsequently shown to be correct|that the consumption-wealth ratio is constant.
I have dened 1 + C=W  e. It follows, then, that




































Dening d=p as usual,
d=p = # + (1   #)   c(   ): (49)
Setting  = 1, we get an expression for c=w   which can be solved for :
 = c=w = # + (1   #)   c(1   );
from which it follows that
 =    c(1   ) 
1    
 (   1)
:
Note that this exercise conrms the provisional assumption made above that  is con-
stant.
Substituting back into (49), we have
dp =   
1    
 (   1)
c(1   )   c(   ):
We also have, as before, that








er = # + (1   #) + c()   c(   ):
38To summarize, we have






c=w =    c(1   )=#
rp = c(1) + c( )   c(1   ):


























where I have dened ai  Ui=Ci.
I now conjecture that ai = a, some constant, solves (50). If so,
a












which conrms the conjecture that a was constant. Hence,






The cost of all uncertainty, , solves the equation











from which (43) follows.
Similarly,  solves








e   ee c(1 )=#
#=(1 )
;
and after substituting in for e c() from equation (44), we obtain the expression (46).
39